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Abstract 
This paper reviews and develops a theoretical and empirical representation of economic 
incentives for the implementation of pollution control strategies. A number of alternative 
available economic instruments may be thought of which, if applied internationally, could 
encourage implementation of the desired abatement strategies by countries. The paper 
considers means of pushing the countries to minimize abatement cost with them. A 
comparison between the pollution targets achieved by the imposition of a uniform charge rate 
and by differentiated charge rates is discussed and empirical results are provided with 
associated conclusions. These results are then compared with a simple standards setting in the 
form of critical loads, in order to see in an empirical way if economic instruments work better 
than regulations.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Over the past few years acid rain has become one of the most discussed environmental 
issues affecting Europe. It is a problem with technical, economic and political components. 
Technical problems results from atmospheric pollution which causes damage to forests, crops, 
lakes, human health and buildings. Economic issues arise in the form of negative externalities 
since emissions from one country may be deposited in the territory of its neighbours. Finally 
there is a political aspect of the problem because of the need of countries to formulate 
appropriate policies.  
The recognition of acid rain as an externality is vital in economic policy. The OECD 
has studied the long range transport of air pollutants in Europe. The findings show that SO2 is 
transported over long distances and that environmental quality in any one European country is 
significantly affected by the actions of others. It is thus a classic case of externality: the user- 
country may have little reason to concern itself with the sulphur content of the fuels it uses, 
except to the extent that legislation or ‘moral’ incentives force it to take account of emissions. 
The OECD (1979) results suggest that 4% of total U.K. emissions are deposited in 
Scandinavia and this constitutes 8% of total Scandinavia depositions. It has been estimated 
that more than 75% of the sulphur deposited in Sweden originates in other countries, mainly 
continental Europe (north of Alps) and U.K. On the other hand, a substantial part of the 
sulphur emitted in Sweden is deposited in Finland and in the northern Soviet Union. In this 
sense, the acidification problem is truly international, as there are external diseconomy 
problems between countries. 
The presence of transnational externalities implies that gains can be realized in a 
cooperative behaviour. As there is no international or multinational ‘government’ that can 
  
 
 3 
enforce international environmental policy, these problems must be solved by voluntary 
agreements among the countries concerned. The problem is that of finding some institutional 
structure that will facilitate the appropriate agreements. Such a structure must be one that 
makes all parties (countries) better off. Otherwise, any agreement is unlikely. We thus seek 
structures that promise a Pareto-efficient outcome. This paper will review and develop the 
theoretical and empirical representation of economic incentives for the implementation of 
pollution control strategies. The analysis will be developed using the example of sulphur as the 
polluting substance to control.  
BACKGROUND 
 Externalities can take either of two forms: a public (undepletable) form or a private 
(depletable or rival) form. An externality is undepletable (public) when an increase in the 
consumption of a good or a bad by one individual does not reduce its availability to others (e.g. 
noise). Freeman (1982) illustrates the phenomenon of depletable (private) externalities with the 
case of acid rain. In this instance, the sulphur emissions from a particular source are distributed in 
the form of acid-rain. The word ‘depletable’ means that ‘each pound of sulphur emitted to the 
atmosphere must land somewhere and if the quantity falling on A’s land increase, there is less to fall 
elsewhere’. The real issue is whether individual polluters can   influence the distribution of pollution 
once it has fallen. For example, forests and plantation absorb more sulphur than do open areas. This 
filtering effect shifts the ultimate deposition location. Hence, self-protection through afforestation 
can filter the externality to another agent. Similarly, building a central waste disposal facility to 
handle point pollution in a particular location may filter and redistribute the waste. In this way, it is 
possible for polluters to influence the distribution and hence the value of acid deposition.  
 Acid rain is clearly a global problem in that pollution emissions may be deposited anywhere 
in the world, including the country of origin. For practical purposes acid rain may be viewed as a 
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regional reciprocal externality where a group of countries is both the source and the victim of the 
problem.  An important characteristic of this is that transfers of pollution between countries may be 
very unequal in quantity because of the existence of prevailing winds. There are two problems 
associated with regional reciprocal externalities which must be addressed in modelling the cost of 
acid rain abatement. The first is the need to achieve optimal economic efficiency across countries in 
pollution abatement. If this condition is not met scarce economic resources will be wasted. The 
second is the classic economic problem of the free rider: countries will benefit from pollution 
abatement in other countries at no cost.  
 The selection of the appropriate strategies to reach and implement pollution control 
objectives is of crucial importance to planners. Because of the existing differences between 
countries in energy–use patterns, emissions, source location and other economic factors, it is 
unlikely that a single, uniform program of abatement will be appropriate in all countries. 
Appropriateness is defined in terms of cost-effectiveness compatible with specific pollution control 
goal attainment, but also in terms of political and social acceptability as well as administrative 
feasibility. In other words, we must also take into account, for most developed countries, the 
increasing role of ‘ecological’ groups (‘Greens’) and various associations of environment–
protection, the requirement for human population’s  protection, the necessity of purchase, 
installation and improvement of the appropriate abatement technologies, personnel training, 
maintenance costs, and so on. Therefore, required emissions reductions and the corresponding 
expenditures will vary between countries. A deposition target in a given country may be achievable 
at a lower cost by emissions’ reduction in neighbouring countries. However, countries required to 
make large expenditures may be unwilling to pay, especially if the corresponding benefits are likely 
to be gained in other countries.  
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 Economists have for many years proposed that decentralized-based policies are more 
efficient than centralized command–and–control approaches as the solution to the problem of how 
to regulate air pollution cost-effectively in these circumstances (Schultze, C., 1977)(1).  Tietenberg 
(1990) has estimated the relative costs of regulations compared to market mechanisms in eleven 
cases. In four of these, regulations were 1 to 2 times as expensive as market mechanisms, in 5 cases 
regulations were 2 to 10 times more expensive, and in two cases more than 10 times more costly 
than market mechanisms.  
 Mäler (1989, 1990), assuming that marginal damage costs are constant and independent of 
the amount of depositions (i.e. a linear damage function), claims that achieving a second best 
solution by the imposition of a uniform charge rate per tonne of sulphur exported from one country 
to all other countries will be a satisfactory solution on the airborne export of sulphur. In the first–
best optimum one should differentiate charge rates for different countries. Mäler believes that 
differentiation of charge rates would create not only practical problems but also obstacles to 
reaching an agreement and he suggests that the gains from going to the first-best optimum seem to 
be marginal, but he does not provide enough empirical foundation regarding the last of his 
conclusions. It is clear that a tax system such as the one proposed by Mäler will not achieve a first-
best optimum, as it will not differentiate between exports to countries with high marginal damage 
cost and countries with low damage cost.   Any attempt to apply the same charge to each unit of 
sulphur emitted, irrespective of where the emissions occur, is itself extremely inefficient. 
 This paper compares the costs of meeting pollution targets by the imposition of a uniform 
charge rate and by differentiated charge rates. These costs are then compared with a simple 
standards setting in the form of critical loads in order to see in an empirical way if ‘economic 
instruments’ work better than ‘regulations’. Section 1 offers a mathematical model for determining 
optimal abatement strategies. Section 2 explains the ways of implementing optimal abatement 
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strategies for pollution control. A theoretical presentation of policy or economic instruments and 
the existing forms of these instruments in Europe follows. Section 3 reports the empirical results 
obtained. Finally, some general conclusions obtained from this comparison are presented.      
1. A non-linear programming model for determining cost-effective control strategies 
 For determining the cost-effective abatement strategies in Europe, to be written in its 
simplest form as follows:  
               Minimize    
27
1
( )i i
i
C SA

       (1) 
      Subject to     
27
1
( )ji i i
i
d SE SA

   j jD B   j=1,2,...,27            
                
                                                    SAi  0     SEi  0                  i=1,2,...,27            
                        
where the 27 European countries are considered simultaneously, and where SEi is the quantity 
of sulphur emitted in country i, called unconstrained emissions and which are assumed to be 
exogenous in this mathematical problem; SAi is the quantity of sulphur (in tones per year) to 
be abated in country i, i.e. the decision variable; Ci is the cost of abatement in country i ;  and 
dji is the proportion of country i’s emissions deposited (‘exported’) at receptor- country j, 
called the transfer coefficient (0≤dji≤1)
(2); D j is the maximum allowance of deposition in 
country j, called targeted or constrained depositions, and Bj is the level of depositions caused 
by natural sources in receptor- country j, called background pollution(3). The fact that pollution 
may remain in the atmosphere for long periods of time is addressed in the background 
deposition coefficient.  SAi, SEi, D j and Bj are expressed in tonnes (t).  
 Each of the 27 constraints (one for each European country) indicates the minimum 
annual abatement of sulphur depositions Dj to be secured in country j. These reductions are to 
be achieved by abating the sulphur emitted in each of the 27 European countries under 
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consideration. Table 1 presents the unconstrained sulphur emissions and the associated 
deposition levels in the year 2000(4). The function Ci (SAi ) which is the objective function in 
(1), is a non-linear cost function (convex upward- sloping curve implying marginal cost 
increasing with removal level), giving the cost in country i of achieving any level of emissions 
reduction SAi by means of the control technologies available for sulphur abatement
(5). 
   The following abatement technologies, involving different levels of costs and 
applicability (depending on the physical and chemical characteristics of the fuel used), exist in 
most industrialized countries:  
 (a) gas oil desulphurization,  
 (b) heavy fuel oil desulphurization,  
 (c) hard coal washing,  
 (d) in furnace direct limestone injection,  
 (e) flue gas desulphurization and  
 (f) fluidized bed combustion.  
The actual control costs of each abatement technology are defined by national circumstances 
and the abatement cost curves depend on the energy scenario adopted. Abatement costs differ 
considerably among countries even for the same technology, mainly due to country-specific 
factors such as sulphur content of fuels used, capacity utilization, size of installations and 
labour, electricity and construction cost factors. These cost input data were obtained country 
by country, sector by sector and fuel by fuel, where 27 countries (i.e. all Europe), 5 sectors 
and 10 fuels were considered, for the year 2000(6) (Halkos, 1992, 1993).  
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Table 1: Unconstrained emissions in the year 2000 (Emissions), actual   
 depositions (Depositions) and targeted deposition according to critical  
 loads (Targeted depositions) (all in thousand tonnes of sulphur)   
Countries Emissions Depositions Targeted 
depositions 
Albania 200.00 154.00 84.40 
Austria 187.00 376.00 226.70 
Belgium 329.00 180.00 77.75 
Bulgaria 961.00 702.00 217.53 
Czechoslovakia 1216.00 1450.00 1128.80 
Denmark 143.00 109.00 5.10 
Finland 270.00 423.00 282.30 
France 765.00 1183.00 194.95 
GDR 2099.00 952.00 572.10 
FRG 1556.00 1235.00 463.35 
Greece 450.00 594.00 300.66 
Hungary 467.00 436.00 22.94 
Ireland 83.00 71.00 7.82 
Italy 1715.00 1342.00 463.40 
Luxembourg 15.00 7.00 1.00 
Netherlands 242.00 199.00 48.00 
Norway 69.00 247.00 82.00 
Poland  2182.00 1859.00 685.70 
Portugal 218.00 232.00 94.50 
Romania 1374.00 1331.00 315.40 
Spain 2573.00 2012.00 738.50 
Sweden 248.00 534.00 319.30 
Switzerland 50.00 134.00 58.30 
Turkey 2203.00 1976.00 305.60 
USSR 10890.00 13921.00 3531.80 
UK 1844.00 1117.00 458.96 
Yugoslavia 1891.00 1466.00 635.07 
Total 34240.00 34242.00 11321.93 
  
 
 7 
 The important initial assumptions for the derivation of these national abatement cost 
curves are the following:  
- First, control costs are independent of order of introduction.  
- Second, each abatement technology has a fixed coefficient of abatement when 
operating at its defined capacity. For example, an FGD unit has an abatement 
efficiency of 90% (i.e. removes 90% of the sulphur content of the fuel in use) at the 
efficient plant size, while a sorbent limestone injection unit has an abatement efficiency 
of 50% at the efficient plant size.  
- Third, it is assumed that the objective of private users is to minimize the costs of 
abating a given level of emissions.  
- Further, fuel use and costs are assumed given independently of abatement policy. For 
the purposes of this exercise, then, abatement by means of reducing the output of 
electricity or other industrial output is ruled out.   
- Finally, another basic assumption of the cost module is that there is a competitive 
market for sulphur abatement technologies accessible to all European countries. 
Resulting annualized costs of the abatement technologies used for sulphur reduction are 
expressed in United States $ at their 1985 levels (Halkos, 1992, 1993).  
 The economic efficiency of alternative abatement options (expressed as $ per tonne 
pollutant removed) depends on site specific conditions, and a least cost emission control 
function for each source can be estimated by ranking alternative options in order of increasing 
marginal cost of control. To do so, technologies are sorted so that marginal abatement costs 
increase with the level of abatement sought.  Marginal costs increases are due to the effect of 
switching between technologies as the scale or level of abatement rises. The marginal cost 
curve has a staircase shape (i.e. it is a discontinuous step function) with each step representing 
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the incremental effect of a particular discrete abatement technology. The level of each step 
indicates the incremental cost of a technology, and the range of each step the maximum 
incremental amount of sulphur removed by introducing that technology. The sequence of 
efficient technologies gives us the long run marginal cost of abatement. If an abatement 
technology is introduced which has a lower marginal cost at some level of abatement than the 
technology applied before, then this technology should have been applied first.  The control 
methods applied before are not taken into consideration. The most cost–effective techniques 
are the proper abatement techniques for the national decision maker. 
 It is assumed that the regulatory authority seeks to maximize abatement subject to a 
budget constraint: a cheaper option will always be preferred over a more costly one. It would 
be economically inefficient to introduce relatively costly control options unless opportunities 
for using cheaper alternatives had already been exhausted. The relative economic efficiency of 
alternative options is compared by reference to "cost-effectiveness" which, for a given option 
at a given site, is the total annualized cost divided by the annual tonnes of pollutant removed.  
This type of cost function is potentially useful to policy-makers because it indicates the 
maximum level of emission abatement that can be achieved with a given budget constraint. 
That is, we look for an efficient frontier or a minimal cost envelope, which will give us the 
optimal total cost function; i.e. the corresponding point on the marginal cost curve specifies 
the set of country control options which minimize total abatement costs (Rubin et al., 1986; 
Baumol & Oates, 1979; Kneese & Schultze, 1975; Mäler, 1990).  Figure 1 presents an 
example of the marginal abatement cost for the FRG (Halkos, 1992)(7). Let us now turn to the 
presentation of the available economic incentives for the implementation of the optimal 
abatement strategies.  
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2. Policy or economic instruments 
 Environmental control approaches include actions to protect the environment using 
policy instruments, such as regulations or economic instruments like charges, taxes and 
marketable emission permits (or licences). Economic instruments tend to operate more directly 
than regulations. For example, by taxing polluters, the government raises their costs ideally 
bringing their cost curves up to the true social curve (including the cost of pollution) thereby 
internalizing the externality. On the other hand, regulations will generally affect internalization 
indirectly, by requiring countries to change behaviour in a given way to reduce pollution. 
Regulations can vary from the extreme case of prohibition and/or the imposition of production 
quotas on producers to the setting of ‘standards’ for protecting selected target populations. In 
the air pollution field, the use of standards is based on motions governing the relationship 
between emissions at the source level and concentrations in specific air sheds. Direct 
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regulatory instruments, also known as ‘command and control’ mechanisms, are enforcement 
mechanisms and regulations on activities affecting the environment, such as environmental 
(air, water, soil) quantity regulations (in the form of emission standards, fuel quality 
regulations and fuel use regulations).  
 Enforcement policies rely on a variety of legal instruments, ranging from licence 
withdrawal to criminal prosecution. Environmental quality standards protect human health or 
ecosystems. Indicators of ‘quality’ are precisely defined as allowable average concentrations 
over a specific time period for a given pollutant in a particular region. The standards are 
usually based on scientific dose-response relationship. That is, the expected health response 
results from a given dose of pollutant. Critical loads are used in some countries as a basis for 
the definition of environmental quality standards. From a relative sensitivity map of 
ecosystems applied to the indirect effects of acidic depositions in Europe constructed by 
Chadwick and Kuylenstierna (1990) it is possible for each country to calculate the area of land 
in each of five "sensitivity" categories.   
 To each class (category) corresponds a maximum deposition allowance, or ecosystem 
sensitivity threshold, which represents the maximum acceptable level of sulphur deposition on 
these points, denoted by βk (k=1, 2, 3, 4, 5), and expressed in tonnes of sulphur per square 
kilometre (t/km2) per year. These are:               
   Class 1           β1  5.12  t/km
2 per year 
   Class 2           β2 = 2.56  t/km
2 per year 
   Class 3           β3 = 1.28  t/km
2 per year               (2)      
   Class 4           β4 = 0.64  t/km
2 per year 
   Class 5           β5 = 0.32  t/km
2 per year 
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 These critical loads  are based on ecological criteria for which data for the entire 
continent are available, like geology, soil type, vegetation and amount of rainfall (for more 
details regarding the way that these factors are weighted to give these classes of relative 
sensitivity to acidic depositions, see Chadwick and Kuylenstierna, 1990). The authors of this 
categorization estimate that the most sensitive type of terrain (class 5) is able to tolerate at 
most 0.32 tonnes of sulphur depositions per square kilometre per annum without suffering 
ecological damage. At the other extreme, class 1 terrain is assumed to be capable of tolerating 
5.12 tonnes per square kilometre per annum. Therefore, the classes are ranked in order of 
increasing sensitivity: class 1 refers to the least sensitive regions and class 5 to the most 
sensitive regions of each country. Let us call these regions "sensitivity areas".  
 Most of the data required by the model are readily available. The country–specific cost 
functions were explained in section 1. EMEP (1989) gives estimates of the flows of sulphur 
depositions between countries and these are used to compute the transfer coefficients dji. 
Accordingly, we construct the following sensitivity index: 
    
5
1
( )j j jk jk jk
k
D D D a 

                   (3) 
Where aik is the area in nation i lying in sensitivity category k; Djk are the actual depositions in 
each sensitivity area of a given country j; Dj are the actual depositions in country j; and βjk the 
critical load for each sensitivity class k (k= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) given by (2) in country j. Table 1 
presents the targeted depositions according to critical loads. The abatement requirement of 
achieving iD therefore reflects current annual depositions in excess of the environmental 
sensitivity limits proposed by Chadwick and Kuylestierna. It is an index of severity of current 
pollution in the country in excess of some uniform benchmark. 
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 Of course the abatement of sulphur pollution cannot be directed to specific 
geographical areas. Thus, although the scheme described above gives a realistic measure of 
levels of depositions harmful to the environment, it does not necessarily reflect a realistic level 
of abatement required to eliminate ecological damage. It implicitly assumes that abatement can 
be directed in the precise quantities to those areas suffering environmental harm from sulphur 
depositions. In practice, of course, acid rain is indiscriminate in the areas it pollutes. 
Therefore, an important assumption in expression (3) is that air pollutants fall uniformly on the 
country's territory, i.e. that climatic factors which could determine a higher concentration of 
depositions in some regions rather than others such as rain, prevailing winds, variability in the 
level of precipitations and other atmospheric phenomena do not have any effect here. This 
assumption is made for simplicity, because of the obvious difficulty of measuring such effects 
and because the analysis needs to be made practicable. 
 In practice, environmental quality standards take many forms like emissions 
restrictions, restrictions on pollution per unit of an input and restrictions on the use of a 
polluting input. The control of sulphur emissions by emission standards is widely used in air 
and water pollution (Vernon, 1990). They set a maximum allowable rate of pollution output 
for each generic type of source (electricity, industry, petroleum refineries and transport) by 
type of pollutant(8). Furthermore, fuel quality regulations are structured around the types of 
fuels in use (e.g. coal, oil etc) and are limited by the technical possibilities and the costs of 
cleaning process for the different fuels.  At present, varying types of fuel-quality standards are 
in use in nearly all OECD countries. The range of standards varies from 0.2% on light and 
medium fuel oil to 0.3% on gas diesel oil. Control on fuel use has been applied as a strategy 
for air pollution reduction on a permanent or temporary basis to satisfy general environmental 
and health concerns. In some heavily polluted areas such as Ankara, coal is restricted in winter 
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(Vernon, 1990) 
 The second way of implementing optimal abatement strategies for pollution control is 
by the use of emissions’ charges or taxes to encourage abatement. Pollution taxes or charges 
are based on Pigou’s concept of increasing the costs of pollution activities so that they reflect 
the true social cost to society of those activities through environmental damage(9). The essence 
of charges approach is for a tax to be imposed on each unit of sulphur emitted. This implies 
revenues that can go to a Central Authority for the creation of a European fund for air 
pollution control (Bergman, 1986; Hettelingh and Hordijk, 1986; and Mäler, 1990). In this 
case this International Authority would impose a charge on uncontrolled emissions. The 
Authority could then distribute any tax revenue to subsidize further emissions’ abatements.  
 However, the Authority would need to know the shape of the corresponding 
abatement cost functions to be able to set the appropriate emissions’ charge. The emissions’ 
charge yielding the cost-effective uniform emissions abatement strategy can be determined as 
follows:                  
   
27
1
( ) ( )
i
i i i i
SA i
Minimize C SA p SE SA

                                  (4) 
p being the emissions’ charge, and where all the other variables have the meaning explained in 
section 1. But acidic depositions vary greatly by location and with time as well. Uniform 
targets are set with no reference to marginal damage done by the transportation of pollutants 
over long distances and their acidic depositions. Additionally, if the relationship between 
source location and receptor location are not taken into account then the fundamental aspect 
of externality (represented by the transfer coefficients) is not taken under consideration.  
 By contrast with the uniform emissions abatement strategy, the emissions’ charge 
yielding the most cost-effective differentiated emissions abatement strategy would be 
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determined as follows:  
                                            
27 27
1 1
( ) [ ( )]
i
i i j ji i i
SA i j
Minimize C SA p d SE SA
 
                          (5) 
  
where pj is the charge for depositions at receptor-country (or source) j. In the case of our 
mathematical model, the emissions’ charge paid by polluters in the cases corresponding to 
expressions (4) and (5) should then be set respectively as follows:  
     
             
27
*
1
( )i i
i
p SA SA

                                       (6) 
 
and:          
   
27 27
*
1 1
( )j ji i i
i j
p d SA SA
 
      (7) 
 
where SAi
* denotes the optimal required emissions’ reduction of country i according to the 
mathematical model and under the critical loads scenario (see expressions (1) –(3), while SAi  
denotes the emissions’ reduction strategy effectively chosen by country i (10). 
 Economic theory indicates that the optimum rate of pollution charges is at the level 
where the marginal abatement cost is equal to the marginal damage cost of the pollution it is 
intended to abate. In a ‘first-best policy’ one should differentiate the tax rate between different 
exporters according to the size of their damage costs. In the case of limited available 
information a ‘second-best’ but still cost-effective solution is to set a level of uniform charge 
high enough to ensure that polluters will abate pollution to a target level of pollution. Such a 
level of charges is often too high to be acceptable or enforceable for political or other reasons. 
A feasible form of tax in the case of most sulphur emissions is one related to the sulphur 
content of fuels burnt. Any given tax on the sulphur content of fossil fuels will lead to 
desulphurization up to the point where the marginal desulphurization cost per unit of sulphur 
abated equals the tax.  
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 Market incentives such as taxes, charges and permits can lead to solutions superior to 
that of a regulation instrument, provided, however, that the prices or quantities designed to 
achieve a given air quality objective reflect accurately the social costs of pollution, i.e. some 
estimate of the damage suffered by the community if the pollution targets (under the critical 
loads scenario) are not respected. In any case, even if this assumption is relaxed (as in this 
model, which does not consider any estimate of the social costs of air pollution), such market 
approaches can still be considered superior to regulatory ones, since they afford polluters the 
opportunity to avoid paying penalties by striving for a greater abatement cost-effectiveness 
(whereas regulated standards would just be ‘imposed’ on them). It would be efficient for each 
country to arrange for implementation of emissions’ abatement up to the point where the 
marginal cost of abatement is less than or equal to the emissions’ charge; and to pay the 
charge emissions which are relative more expensive to abate. 
 Under a system of emission charges, regulators set prices for emission levels that are 
designed to achieve a given air quality objective. With the third class of instruments, i.e. 
marketable emission licences, regulators establish the quantity of emissions that would achieve 
a given air objective, issue permits to pollute this amount and leave it to the market to decide 
the value of these permits. In theory, both approaches are equivalent in a perfect world of zero 
cost information, administration and legal enforcement in so far as they both minimize the cost 
of achieving a given level of air quality but in practice the two approaches are different. With 
marketable emission permits, the problem of the Authority having to know the shape of 
abatement cost functions is avoided, because in this case countries would be allocated a 
specific number of licences defining the amount of pollutants they would be allowed to emit in 
any given period. The initial number of licences issued in each country would depend on their 
contribution in sensitive receptor areas and on their required depositions’ reduction. In 
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countries upwind of sensitive areas a greater number of licences would be required to emit one 
unit of pollutant than in countries downwind.  
 Grubb (1989), Hoel (1990) and Pearce (1990) have suggested a number of approaches 
to the initial allocation of permits once the total limit on emissions has been agreed. Such an 
approach should rely on the current pollutant’s emissions (in this case sulphur) or the current 
gross national product as far as energy use is linked to economic activity. However, both 
approaches reward polluting countries and restrict developing countries. Grubb (1989) 
suggests that pollution should be the most equitable basis for allocation, but under the 
condition that only adult population counts, to prevent giving an incentive to increase 
population and to reduce the relative benefit to developing countries, which have much higher 
proportion of children in their populations. Finally, another approach is by using the land area. 
This approach has the advantage that can be measured easily and would discourage high 
population densities, but the lack of a link to human activity makes it impracticable. 
 In order to determine whether the market will be sufficiently competitive to produce an 
efficient result (enough participants and transactions), one needs to be able to forecast the final 
distribution of permits. Whether the market for permits has monopolistic features that 
undermine its efficiency depends on whether one, two or more countries account for a large 
share of either sales or purchases (Hahn and Noll, 1983). To predict the concentration in 
permits transactions also requires solving the cost-minimizing problem for participants in the 
market. From this, one can predict a final distribution of permits. This can be compared to the 
initial distribution to generate an estimate of net sales (or purchases) by each country (through 
the central authority), which then can be used to calculate expected market shares. The main 
feature of emissions’ licences is that they are tradable, so that countries in which abatement is 
relatively expensive would be able to buy extra permits rather than pollution control 
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equipment.   
 Formally, the trading system which would yield the cost effective deposition reduction 
strategy involves a separate market in emission licenses for all receptor countries. Each 
country (or source) would have to purchase sufficient licences (defined in terms of deposition 
units at the receptor) in each market to cover its emissions’ rate. The problem faced by the 
country (or source) is then to minimize the sum of expenditures on emissions’ controls and 
licences. This can be expressed as follows:    
                                            
27 27
0
1 1
( ) [ ( ) ]
i
i i j ji i i ji
SA i j
Minimize C SA p d SE SA q
 
                           (8) 
 
Where pj is the prevailing price in receptor-market j and qji
o is the initial allocation of licences 
at receptor-market i allowed to country (or source). However, in such a situation the 
Authority would not have to set Pj : the market itself would find this price, given the initial 
allocation of licences. The role of the Authority would essentially be to determine the initial 
allocation of licences and to supervise the buying and selling of licences between the countries. 
Separate bodies could be set up to supervise swapping of licences within Western and Eastern 
Europe, with an overall coordinating body to arrange such swaps. In the case of our 
mathematical model, one possible initial allocation of licences for a given country could be 
determined as follows:   0 ( , )ji ji j jq f d D D        (9) 
where qji
o  depends on each country’s contribution to deposition in sensitive receptor areas and 
on its required depositions’ reduction, being the constrained depositions jD determined 
according to the critical loads scenario (see table 1).  
 It would be then convenient for countries to buy permits rather than further reduce 
emissions, whenever qji
o <MACi (SAi
*) where MACi (SAi
*) is the marginal abatement cost of 
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country i and SAi
* the corresponding optimal emissions’ reduction determined by the non-
linear programming model. It is worth mentioning that a permanent allocation of permits and 
trading on a permanent basis, creates the problem of powerful parties hoarding rights for 
future use rather than trading. Instead the periodic ‘re-issuing’ of permits according to the 
initial allocation would amount to a system in which permits were leased rather than sold and 
hoarding would not be possible. Finally, the trading requires some sort of enforcement 
procedure, with penalties for countries exceeding the permitted emissions. Hahn and Hester 
(1989) showed that excessively bureaucratic monitoring systems in the USA impede trading.  
 To sum up, the obvious advantage of permits over charges systems is that the former 
avoids the problem of the authority’s uncertainty about abatement costs. The consequence of 
an underestimate of abatement costs in the presence of permits is simply that the price of 
permits is forced-up, whereas the environmental standard is maintained (Rose-Ackerman, 
1977). The charge approach also risks underestimating abatement costs. If the authority is 
wrong about the abatement costs, the charge could be set too low in the sense that polluters 
will prefer to pay in than to invest in abatement equipment, thus sacrificing the desired 
standard. Our next step is to consider the empirical results obtained.  
3. Empirical results 
 Every European country has its own specific national environmental legislation and 
regulations. Some regulations are general, but many are specific on, for example, ambient air 
quality standards, fuel quality standards, emission standards, licences etc. Environmental 
standards and the relevant legislation in the eastern European countries are more lax than the 
EU countries and monitoring is extremely poor. Economic instruments generally have proved 
to have several advantages over regulations. Some of the main aspects of the available 
instruments are now considered to see where the differences are, when they are used for the 
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implementation of optimal abatement strategies.  
 For optimal economic efficiency, a regulatory system that considers each specific 
source of emissions assumes that regulators know enough about the production process they 
are inspecting, and the abatement opportunities applicable to it, to be able to determine the 
optimal emissions reduction for it. Countries are likely to be reluctant to provide accurate 
information to regulators, because some abatement strategies may involve changes in the 
production process which, if revealed as a result of regulation would give away commercial 
secrets. Consequently, standards are unlikely to provide the most cost–effective method of air 
pollution abatement. If countries are cost-minimizers, emissions taxes can lead to the cost-
minimizing solution (Burrows, 1980; Baumol and Oates, 1989; Kneeze and Shultze, 1975; 
Pearce and Turner, 1990).  
 On the contrary, a policy of regulation could achieve this least-cost allocation only if 
the individual polluters’ abatement costs were revealed to the policy maker(11). Moreover, 
marketable permits and emissions charges allow polluters with low abatement costs to benefit 
from reducing pollution to a low level. Polluters with high control costs can pay rather than 
spending on controls. In this way market mechanism allow greater reduction in pollution for 
the same cost, or the same reduction for a lower cost, compared with regulations and 
standards (Vernon, 1990). By giving the polluters a chance to trade, the total cost of pollution 
abatement is minimized compared to the more direct regulatory approach of setting standards 
(Pearce and Turner, 1990).   
 When economists refer to pollution standards, they mean either a uniform reduction on 
pollution emissions or a uniform level of emissions (Baumol and Oates, 1989; Besanko, 1987). 
Emission standards and regulations which require uniform reduction in pollution are 
inefficient, because the costs of reduction are not uniform for all polluters. Under uniform 
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emission standards, some polluters will be reducing emissions less than it would be cost-
effective to do so, while others will be reducing emissions by more than is cost-effective. The 
regulatory approach of differentiated individual standards, selected on the basis of 
environmental impact without any consideration of abatement costs, is an expensive means of 
achieving an emission target. To reach the same emission target by implementing a uniform 
charge means that this target will generate more damage than under regulated individual 
standards, because the market allocation of pollution shares ignores the difference in 
environmental impact between different locations. On the other hand, implementing 
differentiated rates of charge which take into account the differences in environmental impact 
of various polluters’ effluent have an advantage over differential individual standards when 
abatement costs differ between polluters.        
 Mäler (1990) proposes a uniform tax rate of 4 DM per kg of sulphur exported (or 
$1.36 in 1985 US $) on the airborne export of sulphur from one country to all other countries. 
It is clear that a tax system such as the one proposed by Mäler will not achieve a first-best 
optimum, as it will not differentiate between exports to countries with high marginal damage 
cost and countries with low damage cost. Any attempt to apply the same charge to each unit 
of sulphur emitted, irrespective of where the emissions occur, is itself extremely inefficient. In 
a first- best policy one should differentiate the tax rate between different exporters, Mäler 
claims that a differentiation would create not only practical problems but also obstacles to 
reaching an agreement and he suggests that the gains from going to the first-best optimum 
seem to be marginal. In order to check this conclusion, a uniform charge of $1.36 per tonne of 
sulphur exported (obviously for reasons of comparisons) was used in the first case and a set of 
differentiated charge rates implied according to what the marginal cost of abatement is at the 
level of achieving the optimal emission level  (SAi
* ), i.e. p* = MAC (SAi
* ). Tables 2 and 3 
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present the results obtained.  
These tables present the emission and deposition reductions and the associated costs of 
achieving these levels under the scheme of a uniform tax of $1.36 per tonne of sulphur 
exported (table 2) and of differentiated charge rates (table 3). Comparing these tables with 
table 4 of the mathematical model’s results for the critical loads scenario, it can be seen that 
the imposition of charges implies a higher emissions reduction than when we apply simple 
standards in the form of critical loads (i.e. 20908 thousand tonnes sulphur removal for the 
uniform charge case; 19,445 thousand tonnes for the differentiated charge rates; and 17072 
thousand tonnes in the case of simple standards). At the same time, the cost of achieving these 
targets is almost the same in the standards' case and in the differentiated charge rates (even if 
the latter achieves a much higher emissions reduction) and more expensive in the case of the 
uniform charge rate.  This happens, because, as can be seen from table 2 (from the column that 
gives the different charge rates for each country), the uniform charge rate of $1.36 per tonne 
of sulphur exported is, for some major polluters like USSR, Spain, Romania, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, and Italy, much higher than these countries' marginal cost of abatement of achieving 
the optimal SAi
* (i.e. in many cases p* > MAC (SAi
* )).  
 This implies that these countries abate more than they ought to. For instance, USSR 
would abate 1076 thousand tonnes more under the imposition of the uniform charge rate of 
$1.36 than under the case of differentiated charge rates. Its marginal abatement cost at the 
optimal emissions reduction given by the non–linear programming model is only MAC (SAi
*) 
= $0.296 (see table 3). It follows that such countries would prefer to pay the differentiated 
charge (abating less) rather than the uniform charge. On the other hand, the rest of the 
European countries would pay less for achieving the pollution control targets under the  
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Table 2:  A uniform charge rate of $1.36 per tonne sulphur exported  
(Emissions and depositions are in 1000 tonnes S; costs and  charges in m 1985 $) 
 
Countries 
Emissions 
reduction 
Depositions 
reduction 
Total 
Costs 
 
 
Charges 
Albania 118.86 92.31 132.25 1.79 
Austria 112.99 240.57 28.84 39.07 
Belgium 228.94 125.69 191.50 54.28 
Bulgaria 635.01 458.28 207.92 77.42 
Czechoslovakia 749.08 925.88 347.05 34.73 
Denmark 84.55 68.94 47.97 53.25 
Finland 154.99 245.32 140.06 55.11 
France 512.48 845.07 501.13 158.66 
GDR 1329.32 616.19 1099.50 46.46 
FRG 1212.84 879.67 1639.05 84.25 
Greece 352.12 414.59 230.79 58.10 
Hungary 263.69 272.06 92.21 30.48 
Ireland 42.59 39.15 11.84 24.68 
Italy 1035.99 840.57 729.84 335.51 
Luxembourg 5.50 4.00 0.69 4.96 
Netherlands 166.18 139.32 168.85 35.41 
Norway 31.56 150.00 6.39 28.31 
Poland  1352.95 1168.45 723.67 108.21 
Portugal 106.18 142.46 75.22 84.57 
Romania 978.59 877.11 304.11 98.40 
Spain 2134.68 1632.86 850.76 343.64 
Sweden 138.60 322.20 47.42 62.02 
Switzerland 12.62 31.93 2.70 35.55 
Turkey 1059.47 1008.42 449.04 277.29 
USSR 5610.20 7618.51 1619.90 1272.27 
UK 1209.20 735.90 1104.84 325.29 
Yugoslavia 1259.85 962.03 476.25 93.96 
Total 20908  11235 3824 
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Table 3: Differentiated charges rates imposed tonne of sulphur exported (emissions and 
depositions in 1000 tons S; costs and charges in m and differentiated charge rates in 1000 1985 $) 
 
Countries 
Emissions 
reduction 
 
Depositions 
reduction 
 
Total 
costs 
 
Differentiated 
Charge rates 
 
Charges 
 
Albania 118.96 92.31 133.96 18.02 36.02 
Austria 117.13 241.44 36.75 2.429 82.11 
Belgium 247.94 133.21 261.87 3.470 43.37 
Bulgaria 629.28 446.50 201.42 1.197 64.60 
Czechoslovakia 751.69 926.73 356.96 3.261 211.24 
Denmark 114.05 80.20 159.08 4.348 27.33 
Finland 185.20 254.05 330.07 23.53 883.72 
France 527.82 843.93 545.89 2.520 359.88 
GDR 1316.91 616.19 922.27 19.60 567.41 
FRG 1221.17 891.50 1679.36 4.910 340.28 
Greece 360.94 410.23 247.39 3.200 159.16 
Hungary 264.78 270.82 94.07 1.096 27.10 
Ireland 30.06 32.00 4.02 1.600 0.34 
Italy 992.30 811.98 673.40 1.100 222.18 
Luxembourg 6.61 4.27 02.74 0.500 0.42 
Netherlands 178.51 146.03 215.64 3.676 44.82 
Norway 41.48 159.56 32.27 3.184 70.59 
Poland  1380.54 1174.91 814.61 7.215 541.42 
Portugal 134.35 156.83 121.33 2.900 103.59 
Romania 968.84 851.12 293.98 0.322 32.61 
Spain 2000.31 1546.97 690.04 0.248 73.77 
Sweden 154.17 336.32 90.32 3.468 164.00 
Switzerland 13.54 30.73 03.89 1.860 0.43 
Turkey 616.48 667.78 186.79 0.320 165.43 
USSR 4534.00 6543.34 922.58 0.296 650.20 
UK 1278.33 770.76 1285.80 1.787 190.85 
Yugoslavia 1259.66 955.22 475.95 1.470 130.96 
Total 19445  10783  5194 
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Table 4: Standards imposition in the form of critical loads (emissions and  
               depositions are in 1000 tonnes S; costs and benefits in m 1985 $) 
 
Countries 
Emissions 
reduction 
 
Depositions 
reduction 
 
Total 
costs 
 
Albania 118.97 92.31 134.06 
Austria 116.82 234.19 36.04 
Belgium 236.55 125.69 213.22 
Bulgaria 634.60 429.47 207.42 
Czechoslovakia 749.38 903.00 348.11 
Denmark 109.50 77.02 141.44 
Finland 189.05 245..32 400.60 
France 473.77 669.65 434.80 
GDR 1336.4 616.19 1228.3 
FRG 1209.6 855.78 1625.3 
Greece 365.80 401.12 260.69 
Hungary 262.02 261.72 89.66 
Ireland 8.92 17.10 0.17 
Italy 979.24 765.56 657.66 
Luxembourg 3.50 3.49 0.06 
Netherlands 167.44 137.61 173.17 
Norway 35.47 148.62 14.11 
Poland  1384.2 1156.22 831.94 
Portugal 140.77 128.72 136.05 
Romania 713.79 719.99 192.56 
Spain 1030.5 845.41 241.15 
Sweden 154.88 324.02 94.11 
Switzerland 9.34 73.40 0.46 
Turkey 390.09 483.64 121.12 
USSR 3881.4 5762.22 671.95 
UK 1115.8 668.99 906.43 
Yugoslavia 1254.4 925.71 468.53 
Total 17072 17072 9634.1 
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uniform charge rate than under the differentiated charge rates. The reason is the same. The 
differentiated charge rate corresponding to the optimal abatement level is much higher than  
the uniform charge rate of $1.36/tonne S exported and so these countries would prefer to pay 
the uniform charge.   
 Obviously a high uniform charge rate achieves a high emissions reduction but it is not 
the most cost-effective way of achieving a pollution target. Mäler’s  conclusion that the 
difference between the first and the second best solutions is marginal, may be valid for certain 
countries and regions (for example for Europe's aggregate emissions reduction) but is not 
valid for all countries and regions. If p* > MAC (SAi
* ), which indicates that the uniform 
charge rate is higher than what corresponds to the first-best optimum, then countries will 
prefer to pay a differentiated charge than to abate, and vice versa. Finally, from tables 2 and 3, 
it can be seen, that the uniform charge rate raises revenue of $3824 million, while the 
differentiated charge case raises revenue of $5194 million(13). Therefore, moving from the first-
best optimum to a uniform charge rate does make a difference.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Various economic incentives exist to implement ‘optimal’ abatement strategies. Using a 
simple mathematical model it was shown  
- First, that the imposition of charges implies a higher emissions reduction than when we 
apply simple standards in the form of critical loads.  
- Second, that the cost of achieving these targets is almost the same for the simple 
standards' case and the differentiated charge rates (even if the latter achieves a much 
higher emissions reduction) and more expensive for the case of the uniform charge 
rate.  
- Third, it was shown that a high uniform charge rate achieves a high emissions reduction 
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but this result may be due to the fact that for some major polluters it is cheaper to 
abate than to pay the charge.  
Therefore, although there may not be a significant difference moving from the first to the 
second best solution across countries it may be quite different within countries. That is, it was 
shown that moving from the first-best optimum to a uniform charge rate does make a 
difference. Finally, it was shown that differentiated charge rates raise more revenues than a 
uniform charge rate. 
 Charges have two purposes other than raising general revenues: namely, to act as an 
incentive to encourage polluters to reduce harmful emissions because it is cheaper than paying 
the charge and to provide a fund for financing pollution control. The implementation of 
differentiated charge rates has an advantage over differentiated standards in so far as 
abatement costs differ between polluters. Polluters with high abatement costs can pay rather 
than spending on control.   However, regulations will work better than charges for countries 
where the pollutant's abatement cost curve is flat, and charges will achieve better results for 
countries where the control cost is steep. In the richer countries, efficiency would be enhanced 
if the PPP were more adhered to, using a combination of economic instruments and regulatory 
approaches. The former generally have proved to have several advantages over regulatory 
laws: they are relatively easy to administer, cost-effective, flexible, they provide a source of 
finance, and they are less rigid and static and encourage innovation. They are also likely to be 
used with an increasing frequency in the richer European countries.  
 It is worth mentioning that market mechanisms do not invalidate regulatory approaches; 
they are, and must be, an adjunct to them. But in doing so, one must be careful that the 
charges imposed, as well as the levels at which they are imposed, are not introduced for 
financial reasons but for economic efficiency. 
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NOTES 
(1) There is a wide body of literature addressing issues of the economics of regulation and 
public choice reviewed in, for example Stigler (1971) and Mueller (1989). 
 
(2) The estimates of the flows of sulphur emissions and the subsequent depositions between 
countries are based on the EMEP model (European Monitoring and Evaluation Program, 
Norwegian Meteorological Institute) from which the cross-country "transfer coefficients" dji 
and dii which measure the trade-off of sulphur (total dry and wet deposition of sulphur) 
between all single European countries can be obtained. The proportional transfer coefficients 
of the EMEP's transfer matrices have been used with early and provisional unconstrained 
sulphur emission estimates from SEIY, since modified, for the year 2000 (see note 4) to derive 
a transfer matrix of a closed system of 27 countries. There is obviously an uncertainty, 
regarding the elements of this matrix, because of weather variability and different 
meteorological conditions year by year and so on. This means that actual transport matrix 
coefficients will vary from year to year due to these meteorological variations. 
 
(3) The background depositions have been excluded in our model, as far as they are 
attributable to natural sources (such as volcanoes, forest fires, etc) but also to emissions 
whose origin cannot be determined and therefore it is impossible to be tracked by our model. 
Of course, if the background depositions are included, then actual depositions in each 
European country will become even larger.   
 
(4) The estimates of the unconstrained sulphur emissions used in this paper are based on early 
work undertaken by the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) at York. They should, 
however, be regarded as indicative only. Obviously, subsequent revision to estimate of energy 
balances and fuel sulphur content for the year 2000 will lead to revisions of the cost estimates.  
 
(5) To solve this non–linear programming model, a computer – routine was developed in 
FORTRAN. The routine provides, for each scenario, the optimal values of: (a) the decision 
variable (SAi
*), i.e. the emissions reduction achieved, (b) the deposition reduction achieved 
and (c) the corresponding total abatement costs(Ci(SAi)). Of course, these results are given 
country by country and for Europe as a whole.  
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6) Other types of abatement options that are omitted in this approach are abatement through 
energy conservation in its broadest sense (energy demand suppression, fuel switching, 
efficiency measures, fuel substitution and use of low sulphur fuels). 
 
(7) The data on which these estimates are based are projections made prior to the unification 
of Germany. For these reason the report refers to the Federal Republic of Germany, not 
Germany.  
 
(8) A further distinction between types of point sources is made on the availability of control 
and new ‘cleaner’ process technologies and their cost-effectiveness. These standards are 
closely linked to technology and so are often referred to as technology standards.  
 
(9)  Some people refer to effluent charges as the ‘Polluter Pay Principle, (PPP)’. The PPP 
relies on the idea that one who causes an environmental problem has the responsibility to take 
the necessary measures to eliminate the problem and bear the full cost of the measures. It was 
adopted by the OECD countries in 1972. For further details see OECD (1975). 
 
(10) To solve problems (4) – (7), a computer routine, similar to that of the non linear program 
mentioned in note 5, was developed in FORTRAN in order to use the proper NAG library 
routines.  
 
(11) In general, when pollutant’s abatement cost curve is flat, regulations work better than 
price regulations,. In concern, when a pollutant’s abatement cost is steep, price regulations 
probably work better (UK, CEED, 1986; Weitzman, 1974). 
 
(12) Mäler does not provide any explanation for the choice of the level. The Swedish 
Environment and Energy Ministry in 1989 suggested a charge on sulphur dioxide emissions 
from the combustion of coal and peat equal to $5 per tone of sulphur emitted (for details see 
Vernon, 1990). 
 
(13) Regulation does not have the same revenue-generating capability as a pollution charge, at 
least if there are no violations of the limits set under regulations. This is due to the absence of 
a charge for the pollution units below the limits regulated. Once violations are allowed for, 
even regulation generates revenue from fines. On the contrary, a charge has the extra source 
revenue from intramarginal units of pollution which is lacking under regulation (Burrows, 
1980). 
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